Criminal Law Library Blog
A new federal framework is significantly changing the role that state and local public-safety agencies may play in responding to potentially dangerous drones. As summarized in a July 13, 2026, executive brief published by DRONERESPONDERS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), working with the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS), has released a series of documents implementing provisions of the SAFER SKIES Act and establishing a national framework for counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) operations.
The importance of the framework lies not simply in new technology, but in the expansion of lawful counter drone capabilities beyond federal agencies. Under the framework, qualified state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) agencies may obtain the training, certification, and accreditation necessary to detect and track drones and, under more demanding requirements, take action against drones that pose threats within their jurisdictions. Participation is voluntary, allowing agencies to determine whether a counter drone capability is appropriate for their particular responsibilities, threat environment, and resources.
Two Levels of Counter Drone Capability
The framework distinguishes between detection and warning and the considerably more consequential power of mitigation.
At the first level, trained personnel may detect, identify, monitor, and track drones and warn their operators. According to DRONERESPONDERS, this capability requires completion of a free online certification course offered through the FBI’s National Counter-UAS Training Center (NCUTC).
Mitigation goes substantially further. Properly trained and authorized personnel may be able to disrupt, disable, take control of, or otherwise stop a drone that presents a threat. Because these actions can interfere directly with an aircraft and its communications, mitigation requires advanced resident training through the NCUTC as well as additional oversight. FBI testimony concerning implementation of the SAFER SKIES Act similarly emphasizes federal training and certification as prerequisites for expanded SLTT counter-UAS authority.
What Technologies Are Authorized?
The framework’s initial Authorized Technologies List identifies three categories of counter-UAS technology:
- radio-frequency (RF) detection and interception of command-and-control signals;
- RF protocol manipulation, sometimes described as a cyber takeover of a drone; and
- RF disruption or jamming of drone control links.
More traditional detection technologies, including radar, cameras, acoustic sensors, and Remote ID receivers, are not displaced by the framework and may continue to be used under existing legal authorities.
The distinction is important. Some methods of drone detection are relatively passive, while technologies that intercept communications, manipulate control signals, or disable an aircraft can implicate federal communications, surveillance, and aviation laws. The FBI has specifically recognized this distinction in explaining why certain detection and mitigation activities require statutory authorization.
Where Might These Powers Be Used?
The framework is particularly directed toward protecting locations and activities where unauthorized or hostile drones could create serious public-safety risks, including correctional facilities, large public events and mass gatherings, critical infrastructure, and public-safety personnel and facilities.
The practical importance of such capabilities has already become apparent at major public events. During the 2026 FIFA World Cup, for example, the FBI reported that DHS and FBI counter UAS operations resulted in the seizure of more than 700 unauthorized drones nationwide.
Funding for State and Local Programs
A potentially important element of the new framework is federal financial assistance. The FBI Decision Brief, as summarized by DRONERESPONDERS, identifies a $500 million FEMA Counter UAS Grant Program for fiscal years 2026 and 27. Detection and tracking programs are broadly eligible, while funding for mitigation capabilities is tied more closely to personnel who have completed, or are scheduled to complete, the required NCUTC training. Other potential funding sources include the Byrne Justice Assistance Grant and COPS programs.
This could make counter UAS programs feasible for jurisdictions that otherwise could not afford the specialized equipment, training, and continuing operational expenses involved.
Privacy, Oversight, and Accountability
Expanded counter drone authority also raises significant questions concerning privacy, surveillance, communications interception, and government accountability. The framework therefore includes accreditation requirements, operational planning, federal coordination, post-operation reporting, auditing, and privacy protections.
According to the DRONERESPONDERS summary, intercepted communications generally must be deleted within 180 days, and the counter UAS authority may not be converted into a general-purpose surveillance capability.
These safeguards are particularly important because some counter drone technologies do more than determine that an aircraft is present. They may acquire information associated with communications between the drone and its operator or interfere directly with those communications.
More Than a Technology-Purchasing Decision
One of the most useful observations in the FBI’s Countering Drones: A Decision Brief, as highlighted by DRONERESPONDERS, is that establishing a counter-UAS program involves considerably more than purchasing equipment.
An agency contemplating such a program must consider personnel training, operating procedures, legal review, coordination with federal authorities, continuing certification and training, reporting requirements, equipment maintenance, and long-term financial sustainability.
Consequently, not every agency necessarily needs a full mitigation capability. Some may conclude that detection and warning are sufficient. Others may find that regional cooperation or mutual-aid arrangements provide a more practical and economical alternative to developing an independent counter-drone program.
Why Librarians and Researchers Should Care
The new counter-UAS framework deserves attention beyond the law-enforcement and emergency-management communities. It sits at the intersection of aviation law, communications law, privacy, surveillance, cybersecurity, federalism, public safety, and rapidly developing drone technology.
For librarians and researchers, the framework also illustrates why drone regulation can no longer be examined solely through traditional FAA rules governing who may fly drones and where they may operate. An increasingly important second body of law and policy concerns who may detect a drone, obtain information about it, interfere with its communications, assume control of it, or disable it—and under what circumstances.
These questions are likely to generate an expanding body of statutes, regulations, agency guidance, training standards, operational policies, privacy requirements, and eventually judicial interpretation. Careful preservation and monitoring of the underlying government documents will therefore be important for researchers attempting to understand how counter drone authority develops in practice.
Conclusion
The framework described by DRONERESPONDERS represents an important development in the evolution of American drone policy. The federal government is moving toward a model in which appropriately trained and accredited state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies can assume a greater role in protecting their communities from dangerous or unauthorized drones.
At the same time, the framework attempts to place that expanded authority within a structure of federal training, technological controls, accreditation, reporting, privacy protections, and continuing oversight. The central policy challenge will be maintaining that balance: giving public-safety agencies effective tools to respond to genuine drone threats while protecting lawful aviation, communications, privacy, and public trust.