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PRESS = BRIEFINGBYSECRETARY OF THE = TREASURY=20 TIMOTHY GEITHNER U.S. Department of=20 Treasury
Washington, = D.C. 8:56 A.M. = EDT

  SECRETARY=20 GEITHNER:   Thanks for coming. Nice to see you. = Obviously=20 we're announcing this morning the next stage of our broad plan to help = repair=20 the financial system. But I want to start by stepping back, = putting this=20 in broader context. Just to state again = the start=20 proposition that to get this economy back on track we need to get this = very=20 powerful stimulus program in place as quickly as possible. It will = help=20 get millions of Americans back to work, help support and stimulate = private=20 investment. But for that to work, we need to move very = aggressively to get=20 our financial system back to the point where it's providing the credit = necessary=20 for recovery.
That agenda, the = financial=20 agenda, which is such a critical complement of recovery, has several = critical=20 parts. And let me just walk through these first before I get to = the=20 details of today's announcement. First, we have put = in place a=20 series of very powerful targeted programs to help address the housing = crisis, to=20 help catalyze small business lending. We are moving to start a = =96- you saw=20 last week =96- a broad-based program to get the secondary markets = working again,=20 too. Those markets, as you know, are very critical to the capacity = of auto=20 financed markets to work, muni markets, student lending markets, = consumer credit=20 markets, also small business markets. And you saw last week that = in the=20 first stage of this new fed Treasury program $9 billion in issuance, = four times=20 the level of -- more than the last four months alone. And that = will make a=20 material difference in bringing interest rates down. We announced as the = first=20 step in our broad framework a plan to make sure that banks have enough = capital=20 to survive a deeper recession. We're going through this very carefully = designed=20 capital assessment process, that's designed to bring a more consistent, = more=20 conservative, more forward-looking view of the scale of losses banks may = face in=20 a deeper recession. But the critical part of that program is to = make it=20 clear that they will be able to raise capital from the government if = they can't=20 raise in the markets so that they can get through a deeper = recession. That=20 will help reduce the odds of a deeper recession, help make sure, again, = they can=20 provide a level of lending that will be necessary to support = recovery. I just want to = start with=20 those three things before I go into today's announcement again, and go = through=20 them again to make you understand how important they are. First, targeted = programs to=20 help address the housing crisis which have already helped bring interest = rates=20 down, will help millions of Americans be able to refinance, take = advantage of=20 lower rates, reduce monthly payments, help reduce foreclosure = risk. =20 Targeted program directly at the constraints on small business lending; = very=20 strong broad-based program that will help get securitization in markets = going=20 again. You saw its first initial launch last week. And a = program of=20 insurance -- you could call it capital insurance for the banking system = so that=20 banks have the cushion of capital necessary to lend and expand even if = the=20 economy goes through a broader -- a deeper recession. Now, today -- today = we're=20 announcing a innovative plan for helping to provide a market for the = legacy=20 assets that are a core of this basic problem in our financial = system. =20 Right now, you know, banks are still holding on to a large amount of = loans that=20 were made before the recession, during the four years in the run-up to = the peak=20 of the boom.
Because there's no = financing=20 available to the markets, because there's huge uncertainty about the = path of the=20 recession, because there's a lot of uncertainty about how to value these = assets,=20 these markets are stuck. And to help unfreeze these markets, = provide a=20 mechanism for working through these problems, we're announcing today a = two-part=20 program.
One piece is a = financing=20 mechanism to allow banks to sell pools of loans. One piece is a = financing=20 mechanism for investors to sell and purchase securities. = Structures are=20 similar, and let me walk through the basic parts of the = structures. In=20 each case we're going to put capital alongside capital from private = investors=20 with financing from the government. So private investors will = share the=20 risk alongside with the taxpayer, and the taxpayer will share returns = alongside=20 private investors. Used as a market = mechanism=20 for establishing pricing and value, that will help protect the = government from=20 overpaying for these assets and taking risks greater than we = should. And=20 it will help bring professional management to these things, and again, = all with=20 the objective of reducing risk to the taxpayer, improving our capacity = =96- have=20 the market work with us to help get out of this. As you see in the = proposals,=20 we expect to put enough capital on the table initially to help leverage = or=20 generate between 500 and perhaps up to a million of purchasing power for = these=20 programs.
Now, if you think = about this=20 alongside the capital program, this will help banks clean up their = balance=20 sheets; it will make it easier for them to help raise private capital; = it will=20 help provide a market for these legacy assets that will help reduce = these=20 liquidity risk premium markets, help reduce the risk that people see = further=20 downward spirals in these asset prices, and overall, help increase the = lending=20 capacity of the financial system and reduce credit spreads and lending=20 rates.
Now, like any plan, = you've=20 got to consider them against the alternatives. One alternative is = just to=20 let this dynamic we now see across the system continue. Our = judgment is=20 that would result in the risk of greater deleveraging, a deeper credit = crunch,=20 greater headwinds for the economy going forward, and a longer, deeper=20 recession.
Another alternative = is to=20 have the government come in and purchase directly these assets and hold = those,=20 manage them, and sell them over time. That would involve the = government=20 assuming much more risk than under this program; create much greater = challenges=20 for managing these things sensibly over time; and again leave, in our = judgment,=20 the government more exposed, assuming more risk than it should, more = exposed to=20 loss over time, and in our judgment not a plausible, effective=20 alternative.
Now, we're the = United States=20 of America. We are not Sweden. We have a very complicated = financial=20 system. Getting through this requires banks being strong enough = again they=20 can lend comfortably through a deep recession, but that's not = enough. We=20 have to complement this program to help strengthen the banking system = with a=20 range of approaches to help get these securities markets back to the = point where=20 they're working again. So that again the = basic=20 mechanics that are so important to small business lending, large = business=20 borrowing, consumer borrowing, auto finance, student loans, et cetera -- = that=20 entire framework of mechanism is back to the point where it's working = better for=20 recovery. So our approach is designed to do both those two=20 things.
Now, we are going = through a=20 very challenging environment now. There is deep skepticism across = the=20 country, deep anger and outrage, frustration about the point -- about = the place=20 we are in as a country, where people that were careful and prudent in = their=20 financial decisions, businesses that were conservative in how they chose = how=20 much leverage they took on, are facing substantial damage because of the = actions=20 of a range of institutions that took too much risk and brought our = financial=20 system and our economy to the point where we're facing such an acute, = deep=20 recession.
That anger and = outrage is=20 perfectly understandable and if we are going to get through this we have = to=20 engender more confidence in the American people that we're going to use=20 taxpayer's money effectively and wisely to, again, help get credit = flowing=20 again, help reduce borrowing costs. And we want to make sure that our = assistance=20 is not going to reward failure, to benefit people who got us into this = mess --=20 and that is critically important. But as the = President said, we=20 also need to make it clear that our actions need to be guided by the = basic=20 objective of doing what is necessary to help get recovery back more=20 quickly. And that requires that we have a better functioning = financial=20 system, where people are willing to come in and take risk. The great risk we = face now is=20 that after a long period of irresponsibility and excessive risk-taking, = that the=20 system will not take enough risk now. And for these programs to = work,=20 investors have to be prepared to take risk. And for them to take = risk,=20 they have to be more confident than they are today that there's going to = be a=20 clear set of rules of the game applied consistently and enforced fairly = going=20 forward.
I'm happy to take = any=20 questions. Yes. Q    = Sir, you=20 mentioned the municipal market. Chairman Frank and about 25 other = members=20 of Congress sent you and Chairman Bernanke a letter to provide temporary = relief=20 to the short-term municipal debt market. I'm wondering if that's = been=20 considered by Treasury, if that's a possibility at all? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 We're taking a careful look at it. Q    = Could you=20 repeat the question? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: The=20 question is -- I believe is, a number of members of Congress, governors, = elected=20 officials across the country, have encouraged us to explore ways to help = bring=20 about further improvements in the muni market. There has been some = improvement in the muni market and we are looking at a range of options = to see=20 if we help reinforce those improvements, including the specific measures = that=20 Chairman Frank and others are considering. Yes. Q    = Tim,=20 obviously you set out the structure and framework today, but for good = reasons=20 you haven't delved into the pricing. The pricing on which you make = finance=20 available to the private sector will obviously be crucial for = understanding how=20 this is likely to affect asset prices and, indeed, then the stock prices = and=20 capital needs of banks. Can you at least give us in conceptual = terms some=20 indication of what will guide the pricing decisions here on the = loans? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: All=20 right, two basic pricing things are at issue here. One is how the = price=20 for the assets is established. And the principal -- a principal = virtue of=20 this mechanism is to use the financial interests of investors to help = set the=20 price. Because they have money at risk, they're going to make = better=20 judgments about how to set the price of these assets than the government = could=20 hope to make.
There's a second = issue about=20 the terms of the financing the government makes available, and let me = just=20 establish a basic principle there too. As you see across the range = of=20 things that the Federal Reserve has done over the past two years, one = basic=20 principle that's important is to say that you establish the pricing so = that as=20 conditions normalize, the market will no longer want to or find it = economic to=20 rely on financing from the government. Basic principle = underpin all=20 the things the Fed has done and that's why you see in some parts of the = Fed=20 programs, the Fed balance sheet is shrinking even though we have a = financial=20 system so under acute pressure. Yes. Q    = Have you=20 gotten any interest from the private sector in getting involved in this=20 program?
SECRETARY = GEITHNER: We=20 have seen and I expect to see a lot of interest from the private=20 sector.
Q    = Can you=20 give us any names? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 But, you know, just to say -- just to make a point. You're going = to have=20 people -- this is true of any financial crisis -- who want the = government to=20 take on much more risk. So there are people who say that we'd like = the=20 government to take more risk or a greater share of the losses than this = program=20 identifies or anticipates. But I think you're going to see a fair = amount=20 of interest in this. Yes. Q    = Yes, on=20 the executive pay parts of this, the plan is to have passive investors = not=20 subject to that. But what about the asset managers? Will = they be=20 subject to any pay restrictions? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: I'm=20 going to answer this carefully. The basic answer is no. If = you're=20 already an institution that's received TARP assistance, then you would = be=20 covered by the conditions -- the range of conditions that will apply to = people=20 who receive capital from the government. But these programs = are=20 different programs. These are generally available programs. = They're=20 designed -- like our housing plan, like the small business plan -- to = get these=20 broader markets working again. And for those reasons the comp = conditions=20 will not apply to the asset managers and investors in the = program. Q    = Are you=20 concerned about a backlash from AIG in making that decision? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: No,=20 this was a judgment that -- that broad strategy approach has been at the = core of=20 our strategy from the beginning. It was clear in the proposals the = President laid out on February 4th. It underpins the subsequent = comp=20 conditions that were passed as part of recovery too, and I think there's = really=20 broad support for that judgment. Yes. Q    = Thank=20 you. What happens if you go to all this trouble to figure out how = much the=20 FDIC is going to offer, in terms of leverage, and get all this together, = have=20 the auction, the price comes in, and the bank says, we don't like that = price, we=20 don't want to hand over? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Well, again, you can't know for sure how much participation you're going = to get,=20 and people get a chance to sort of assess what the balance is for = them. =20 And the incentives banks face are very -- you know, right now, again, = you don't=20 really have a viable market in which to unload and sell these = assets. But=20 because you're holding on to them, it is harder for banks to generate = greater=20 confidence among their creditors and their investors; it's harder for = them to=20 raise capital privately. So they face a = balance. =20 This will make it easier for them to raise capital privately because = they'll=20 have a cleaner balance sheet; there will be more confidence in the --=20 externally, people's capacity to evaluate their risk in that = context. And=20 that will help induce participation, as well. But as I said, you = know, in=20 financial crises, people always want the government to take more risk, = or try to=20 put more of the losses on the balance sheet of the government. And = we're=20 trying to find a balance that's better for the taxpayer. Q    = How long=20 do you think it'll take to get these things up and running? I = mean, it=20 seems like there's a lot of evaluation required by the FDIC and by the = banks and=20 by the investors before you could have an auction like this. SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Well, again, the full -- all the financial agencies that are relevant to = this=20 are going to work very hard to put it in place as quickly as = possible. One of the great = virtues of=20 this is it builds off an established mechanism. The FDIC has a lot = of=20 experience in operating and running, and they're optimistic that they = can move=20 quite quickly on this front, and we think we also moved quite quickly on = the=20 securities front, as well. I've been going = left. I=20 want to go right. Q    = What=20 happens if you sent some of the assets they sell, they sell for a low = price, and=20 then some of the banks have to write down what they have and some of the = new=20 banks become insolvent? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Well, I don't think you should be particularly worried about that risk = in the=20 way this is designed, this program is designed. Because, just to = step back=20 a little bit and look at the bank piece of it -- again, banks have a = right to=20 sell a pool of loans to a dedicated fund which will bring in private = capital=20 with government financing for that purpose, and that helps reduce that = risk=20 again.
But again, you = should think=20 about this in the context of a broader program where the government is = going to=20 provide a facility, in the form of capital, as insurance against the = risk of a=20 deeper recession. So you should think about these as complementary=20 things.
In any case, you're = going to=20 see the -- remember, the government is -- what we're basically saying is = we will=20 make sure that there is sufficient capital in the system for these = institutions=20 to manage through -- comfortably manage through a deeper = recession. The=20 virtue of that, of course, is that with that confidence, you're going to = have a=20 greater lending capacity in the system, reduce risk of sort of = progressive=20 cycles of deleveraging, and that'll make it more likely that you get = recovery=20 back on track more quickly. Yes. Q    = On the --=20 Dr. Romer was making the rounds this morning on the program on the=20 networks. And she said that across the programs on the issue of = leverage=20 net/net, she estimated that private investors would end up putting about = seven=20 to eight cents on the dollar into the programs across all of them at the = end of=20 the day. Can you comment on that, and if so, how do you get to = that=20 number?
SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Well, without looking into exactly what they said, I don't want to = comment on=20 her particular thing, so let me just do the basic objectives and design=20 thing.
Again, dollar of = capital from=20 the Treasury alongside dollar of capital from a private investor, = there's=20 financing available from the government on top of that. For that = financing=20 to be at risk, the private investor has to lose all its equity. =20 Okay?
Now, again, you = have to look=20 at the structure against the alternatives. And the alternative = structures=20 all involve the government taking on much more risk with much less = protection=20 against the, you know, endemic problem that governments have in this = context of=20 overpaying adverse selection, getting stuck with a range of risks they = don't=20 understand and can't manage. So that's what this is designed=20 against. But you're -- Q    = Do you=20 have a ballpark number on -- at the end of the day, rough estimate where = private=20 investors be at risk, or generally maybe -- SECRETARY = GEITHNER: The=20 key thing is their capital would be at risk. That's the key = thing. =20 So that's the important benefit in that context. So rather than = having the=20 government assume all the risk in an asset purchase scheme, you're = having=20 substantial risk borne by private investors in this context, and that -- = you=20 know, we're not doing that for their benefit. We're doing it = because we=20 think that's the most effective way to get these markets working again, = to get=20 risk premium down, borrowing costs down, in ways that leave the taxpayer = less=20 exposed.
Q    = But the=20 government will be taking the majority of the risk here once the -- if = you're=20 doing one-for-one losses -- SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Look, there is no doubt the government is taking risk. You cannot = solve a=20 financial crisis without the government assuming risk. The only = question=20 is, how best to do it, and what's the best way to do it; what's the way = to do it=20 where you get the incentives better and you're maximizing the impact of = a=20 marginal dollar of taxpayer assistance. And that's what this is = designed=20 to do. And I am very confident this scheme dominates all the = alternatives=20 for trying to find that balance. Yes. Q    = The FDIC=20 obviously is very involved here. I talked to individual investors, = smaller=20 investors, over the weekend, and some of the stuff that they're worried = about is=20 exactly what's going on with the FDIC: one, that the FDIC needed = to get=20 that $100 billion credit line; two, are they going to extend the size of = deposit=20 insurance, because people are worried about should I buy a $250,000 CD = if the=20 insurance is going to expire at the end of the year; and third, what = about money=20 markets? Does that -- does the money market insurance program need = to=20 expand past April -- the end of April? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Well, I want to step back one sec, because this is a very important = issue. =20 Americans can be fully confident that their deposits in the banking = system are=20 fully safe and protected. The FDIC has proposed -- and we are very = supportive of this -- a range of different measures to give them a = little=20 greater flexibility for managing through this, including, temporarily, = through a=20 larger credit line from the government than the Treasury. And I = think=20 that's a prudent, necessary step; we're perfectly comfortable about that = --=20 perfectly supportive of that. Now, it's also = important that=20 the FDIC has extended their temporary guarantee program for an = additional=20 surcharge, for -- that allows banks and bank holding companies to issue = debt at=20 longer maturities. And we've made it very clear that we want to = make sure=20 that the banking system has the ability to meet its broader commitments = as we go=20 through this challenging period, because that's important to make sure = that we=20 allow -- well, it's sort of -- it's just basically central to trying to = make=20 sure that, again, there's going to be enough credit and rates come = down. =20 So those things are all very important. Money market = guarantee fund=20 is another complement to that. And again, very important for the = American=20 people to understand, that we're going to do what's necessary to protect = the=20 system, to prevent the kind of catastrophic failure that could cause = greater=20 damage to recovery and the financial fabric of the system as we work = through=20 this challenging period. Q    = It's a=20 very tough question. I mean, one of my friends asked me, should I be = thinking=20 about pulling my money out of the money market, you know, when we get to = -- when=20 we get to the middle of April? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Absolutely not. And you see -- again, if you look at, across the = system,=20 about the basic response of investors and depositors, I think you see a=20 appropriate degree of confidence that those resources are safe and=20 comfortable.
Yes. Q    = Looking=20 at this program, it seems as if you're talking about the TALF, talking = about the=20 FDIC -- all of this seems to be designed without having to ask for = additional=20 congressional appropriations. Do you anticipate a scenario in = which more=20 funding would need to be allocated and appropriated? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: We=20 have substantial resources already provided by the Congress that we're = going to=20 put to work in support of this broad program. In the President's = budget, we=20 put a reserve fund in the budget against the possibility that we would = judge=20 that additional resources would be required to do this on a scale that = would,=20 again, help us get out of this more quickly, at least ultimate cost to = the=20 taxpayer. And we will work with the Congress to try to make sure = that=20 there are enough resources over time to do this right. But the judgment = about, you=20 know, what's going to be required is a judgment that we don't need to = make at=20 this time and are not prepared to make at this time. But the basic point = I want to=20 underscore is that we have substantial resources that we're going to = deploy in=20 support of these programs now, and we will work with the Congress over = time to=20 try to make sure that we're doing this in a way that has maximum impact = on=20 trying to get recovery established more quickly than would otherwise be = the=20 case.
And again, the = basic lesson=20 -- I'm sorry, you guys, just give me one sec -- basic lesson of = financial crises=20 is that you get -- recessions are shorter, they cause less damage, you = get lower=20 future deficits, you solve the crisis at least cost to the taxpayer, if = you move=20 more forcefully earlier. Yes. Q    = Sir, you=20 need to win back the confidence of the markets and support for your=20 program. You also need the confidence and support from your = international=20 partners. Would you say that after Horsham, after the meeting in = Horsham,=20 you've moved closer to that goal? And have you heard anything at = Horsham=20 that you really liked and thought useful and that you should=20 implement?
SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Horsham being, for those of you that don't know, where the U.K. = government=20 hosted the last meeting of G7 finance ministers and central bank=20 governors. Am I right, that's what you're referring = to? =20 Okay.
Well, as I said, I = think you=20 saw very broad-based support around the table in that room among the = world's=20 major economies. Those people -- countries in the room represent I think = roughly=20 85 percent of GDP across the globe. You saw very broad support for = the=20 basic strategy that you need to have strong, sustained, macroeconomic = stimulus;=20 aggressive efforts to help recapitalize, strengthen financial systems; = very=20 substantial support for the international financial institutions so that = they=20 can -- they can help counteract, respond to this big withdrawal of = capital flows=20 from emerging market economies. We want them to be able to deploy = a larger=20 amount of resources more quickly in targeted ways to help affect the = countries=20 -- to help the countries most affected by the crisis, all in a framework = where=20 we're all committing to avoid protectionist measures and reaffirm our = commitment=20 to openness to trade and investment. And alongside that, = of=20 course, we want to shape a strong consensus on reform of the = architecture of the=20 financial system to help make sure a crisis like this doesn't happen=20 again. And there is very broad support, very broad consensus, = across those=20 countries -- countries with very diverse conditions, very diverse = financial=20 systems -- on the core elements of a very ambitious set of financial=20 reforms.
So, as I said after = that=20 meeting, I think there is a very broad-based consensus, very strong = support=20 about those -- about that basic strategy. And I think you see the = world=20 really moving with us on this, and I think that will continue, because I = think=20 there's broad appreciation across the -- across the world as a whole = about the=20 scale of the challenges this crisis presents. Q    = Are you=20 saying there is support, there is agreement around American program, = that there=20 are no disagreements, the reports about disagreements were = incorrect? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Well, there are -- you know, we all have slightly different financial = systems,=20 so the precise mix of tools that we're going to employ domestically will = differ. In our system, as I said, you know, banks are a critical = role of=20 our system, but we have a very complicated capital market that = complements our=20 banking system, and so to get our system through this, we're going to = have to do=20 things that other countries don't need to do. But if you look at = the core=20 elements of the program, they all involve a mix of guarantees, funding=20 assurances, capital from the government so you're recapitalizing parts = of the=20 system that need to be recapitalized, and where it's necessary, targeted = programs. You're seeing many countries follow the lead of the = United=20 States in this context -- in the U.K., in Japan, and even other = countries -- to=20 provide direct supports for the credit markets as a complement for = interventions=20 in the banking system. So in the precise = mix of=20 plans countries will adopt, will vary, of course, as it should, because = our=20 systems are different, but on the basic premise that you want to move=20 aggressively, alongside fiscal stimulus to make sure financial systems = are=20 working better, there's broad support for that. Yes. Q    = On the=20 pricing question again, sir, you've said the (inaudible) securities are = the core=20 of the problem, and moving them is -- SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 Loans and securities. Q    = Loans and=20 securities, critical. Can you tell us just a little bit about the = lack of=20 clarity? Is it because -- on the pricing -- is it because you = haven't=20 quite --
SECRETARY = GEITHNER: You=20 mean the features of what the exact price is? Q    = Well, the=20 --
SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 We're using a -- let's just step back for a sec. What we're using = is a=20 market mechanism to establish the price. So people will have to = compete=20 for the ability to take advantage of the financing program and the = capital in=20 order to do that. So, you know, until = you see=20 that process work, you won't know where the market will clear.
Q    = The point=20 is, they -- the potential investors -- can't tell how much it's going to = cost=20 them from the documents you've put out because the terms of the loans = are still=20 not --
SECRETARY = GEITHNER: =20 We're using a established framework we used for laying out all these = programs,=20 where we put out broad details of terms, people have a chance to react, = those=20 evolve so we figure out what's the best mix for the interests of the=20 taxpayer. We're using the same basic approach. And the mechanism = here,=20 again, on the loan side is based on an established mechanism. The = FDIC has=20 a lot of experience in operating and running auctions in these = process. =20 And I think that, you know, again, you're going to find a lot of people = who will=20 say that we'd like the government taking on more risk, or they'd like us = to=20 provide -- put more risk on the table in this context. But I think that = this is a --=20 you know, we're laying out enough details on broad terms that we can get = this=20 process to the point where we're operational relatively = quickly. Q    = Just to=20 follow up. So what you're saying is you have enough detail in hand = to do=20 these deals on a case-by-case basis, is that it, rather than having a = full set=20 of terms that you roll out for everybody to look at all at once, is that = it?
SECRETARY = GEITHNER: No,=20 we're laying out enough detail on terms that we can get to the point = where we=20 can make these operational quickly. But, you know, you have to lay = out a=20 framework so you can have a little bit of iteration and flexibility, = just as --=20 I mean, again, just to use other models, just as the FDIC does when it = runs its=20 basic programs; just as the Fed does when it designs its basic programs; = just=20 like we did on the term asset-backed securities lending facility that = was=20 launched last week. You know, there's just a -- there has to be a = bit of=20 iteration on terms to make sure that we're getting the balance basically = right.
Yes. Q    = Mr.=20 Secretary, how will you know this is working, on the loans and = securities? =20 And more importantly, how will the taxpayers know it is working? = What's=20 the metrics you've developed here or all developing? SECRETARY = GEITHNER: The=20 best metric is to watch what happens to the capacity of people to = borrow, and=20 the price of credit and the price of these assets. That's the = ultimate=20 test.
You won't be able = to fully=20 judge from participation because the existence of these facilities will = affect=20 behavior and incentives. You know, in some sense it operates like = a=20 backstop. So you can have a backstop facility have big effects on = behavior=20 and on the basic dynamics and markets, even if there's relatively = limited=20 use. The best thing to watch, again, is what's happening to = issuance of=20 securities -- just like you saw last week with the first funding of the=20 TALF. Look what happened -- overall issuance -- look what's = happening to=20 risk -- credit risk in markets. That will be the ultimate = test. Q    = Do you=20 have a goal --